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In 2015, Iran entered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US; plus Germany), agreeing to halt its nuclear programs in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. However, the nuclear deal, which works to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, was strongly opposed instead of favoured by Iran’s two largest rivals within the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Israel. Through an exploration of the realist concepts of the security dilemma and power balancing, this article seeks to explain Saudi Arabia and Israel’s opposition
To begin with, it is important to understand the concepts of the security dilemma and the balance of power. According to offensive realism, the international system is anarchic and has no higher ruling body on top of any sovereign states. This leads to a self-help system, where states cannot be sure of the intentions of their peers and so are forced to act only in their own best interest, resulting in the constant pursuit of power maximisation by states. This pursuit of hegemonic power leads states to seek to shift the balance of power in their favour, creating a security threat to their rivals. The concept of the security dilemma refers to situations in which measures a state takes to increase its security inadvertently undermine the security of others, as it is impossible to be sure that measures used to increase a state’s security will not be used offensively. This aggravates the competition among states to pursue power and ultimately leads to a more tense world with more potential for conflict. In order to maintain or dominate the balance of power, increasing military strength and/or forming alliances with states possessing similar goals are commonly pursued strategies by states.
Saudi Arabia and Israel’s long-standing rivalry with Iran is evident from ongoing proxy wars in Middle Eastern zones such as Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. The objective of these proxy wars for Saudi Arabia and Iran is to pursue power maximisation to ensure security, and the objective for Israel is to ensure security around its borders. Evidently, both countries, to maintain leverage in their pursuit of security and the balance of power in the Middle East region, are opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran. However, the nuclear deal, despite halting Iran’s nuclear program, created more imminent threats to the proxy wars in the aforementioned regions. Specifically, the lifting of sanctions granted Iran a huge inflow of funds and frozen assets abroad. This allowed Iran to sustain its proxy wars with Saudi Arabia and Israel by funding militia groups like Hezbollah and Houthis, as well as its own ballistic missile program, which challenges the security of Iran’s two rivals. Following the logic of the security dilemma, sanction removals provided Iran with the ability to consolidate its own security, but threatened Saudi Arabia and Israel’s. This shifted the balance of power in favour of Iran and diminished its rivals’ security, making the nuclear deal unfavourable.
Check out this interesting panel discussion hosted about the Council on Foreign Affairs on the importance and viability of Iran's position on nuclear weapons.
In 2015, Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan stated that “the billions of dollars that Iran will have access to” will destabilise the region. This was echoed by an anonymous Saudi diplomat’s statement arguing that lifting sanctions would embolden Iran to “redesign the region," . Similarly, Israeli officials have also expressed concerns over the threats posed by Iran's funding of proxy wars and ballistic missile programs. In 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that "Iran is conducting a campaign of conquest across the Middle East, and Iran is developing ballistic missiles to threaten the entire world," highlighting fears of an expanding Iranian influence through proxy war and a shifting balance of power with ballistic missiles. These statements collectively reinforce a central concern, that the nuclear deal was economically empowering Iran to intensify proxy warfare, shifting the balance of power and compromising the security interests of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Beyond verbal concerns, Saudi Arabia and Israel took practical actions like forming alliances with each other. Prior to 2015, the two countries never had a formal diplomatic relationship. However, in 2015, the two countries announced a strategic alliance in opposition to Iran’s expansion of power in the Middle East, providing substantial support for Morgenthau's claim that countries will utilise alliance forming to maintain the balance of power.
Indeed, in 2016, Iran invested billions in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and other nations, supporting disruptive groups like Hezbollah. To support the costs, Iran’s government even doubled the IRGC’s budget in 2018. The enormous investments show Iran’s determination to support those groups. Thus, there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia and Israel were practically concerned about the nuclear deal which removed major obstacles for Iran to generate income.
In summary, following the logic of realism, the removal of sanctions increased Iran’s ability to fund militia groups and ballistic missile programs, shifting the balance of power in its own favour and threatening the security of Saudi Arabia and Israel, hence their staunch opposition to the deal. The deal has since collapsed, following the withdrawal of the US in 2018 under the Trump administration and subsequent Iranian defection.
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